Three weeks after the October Brotli emergency, the Node.js project is back with another security release. On November 11, 2026 it shipped v22.23.5, v24.22.3 and v26.13.1. The releases fix 17 CVEs: seven high, six medium and four low. Nothing is rated critical, but the high ones are remotely reachable, and several need nothing more than a default server.
The release also updates bundled dependencies: llhttp 9.4.4 on all lines, undici 8.12.4 on 24.x and 26.x (which carries six of its own cache and redirect fixes) and sqlite 3.54.1 on 22.x and 24.x.
A detail worth noticing: five of the CVEs, including the worst one, credit Chris Rohlf in collaboration with Claude and Anthropic Research.
The one to read first: HTTPS heap leak (CVE-2026-123864)
This is a re-entrancy bug in the HTTPS stack. When JavaScript running inside the HTTP parser’s on_body callback triggers a zero-length TLS write, TLSWrap::DoWrite() calls ClearOut() directly. That decrypts the next TLS record while the parser is still in the middle of the body, re-entering llhttp_execute(). The result is a use-after-free and an out-of-bounds heap read, and the server copies that memory into the request body.
The advisory says an unauthenticated client can read memory belonging to other connections, including TLS private keys and other users’ requests. The conditions:
- a handler that calls
res.flushHeaders()before the request body ends and later callsres.end()with a non-empty chunk, and - any ordinary route that echoes or stores a request body, so the attacker can read the leaked bytes back.
It affects 22.x, 24.x and 26.x. Plain-text node:http is not affected. NVD-sourced trackers list it at CVSS 8.1.
Authentication bypasses in TLS
- CVE-2026-123872 (high, 8.1): on a server with different client-certificate policies per hostname, a client that authenticated for an allowed host can renegotiate TLS 1.2 under a different servername and carry its authentication to the stricter host. The fix blocks SNI changes through renegotiation, HelloRetryRequest and session resumption, and disables resumption for mTLS without a session id context. All lines.
- CVE-2026-123867 (medium): if you call
server.addContext(host, { ca: protectedCA })without a server certificate in that context, the per-host CA is never installed and the handshake falls back to the default client CA. A client trusted only by the default CA can complete mTLS to the protected host. - CVE-2026-123877 (medium):
https.Agentgave the same session-cache key to a request that omitscaand one that passesca: []. With TLS 1.3 resumption, the stricter request could reuse a session authenticated under the default trust store.
HTTP/2: crashes, leaks and use-after-frees
| CVE | Severity | What a remote client can do | Lines |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-123863 | High | Abort the server via a failed memory-accounting assertion in ~Http2Session(); needs only a handler that responds before the body ends | 24, 26 |
| CVE-2026-123865 | High | Leak memory and file descriptors forever by triggering a protocol error during shutdown (start it with GOAWAY(NO_ERROR)) | 22, 24, 26 |
| CVE-2026-123866 | High | Receive freed response memory from other connections when a backpressured stream is torn down | 22, 24, 26 |
| CVE-2026-123874 | High | Use-after-free when a respondWithFile() stream is reset during a pending write | 24, 26 |
| CVE-2026-123828 | Medium | One-byte heap overflow in session.altsvc() with a long :authority | 24, 26 |
| CVE-2026-123868 | Medium | Exhaust memory; queued inbound DATA was never charged to maxSessionMemory | 24, 26 |
| CVE-2026-123875 | Medium | Crash file-serving handlers by cancelling a few downloads | 22, 24, 26 |
On the TLS side, CVE-2026-126051 (high) lets a client crash a server that uses SNICallback, OCSPRequest, newSession, resumeSession or server.addContext(): the socket is destroyed before a deferred handshake callback runs, and the process throws an uncaught exception.
The lower-severity fixes include proxy credentials leaking into ERR_PROXY_INVALID_CONFIG messages (CVE-2026-123871), a zlib params() + destroy() crash (CVE-2026-123862) and several Permission Model gaps, among them a wildcard --allow-fs-read rule that also matched the bare path (CVE-2026-106071).
What to do
- Upgrade to 22.23.5, 24.22.3 or 26.13.1, and rebuild container images that pin a Node patch version. End-of-life lines are affected and get no fix.
- If you terminate HTTPS or HTTP/2 directly in Node rather than behind a proxy, treat this as urgent. Exposure is much higher than for apps behind a load balancer that speaks HTTP/1.1 to the backend.
- If you rely on per-host mTLS (
addContextwith different CAs), check after upgrading that every protected context carries its own certificate and that TLS 1.2 renegotiation is not needed by your clients. - If you can’t patch immediately, put a reverse proxy in front that terminates TLS and HTTP/2. That removes the remote paths for most of the high-severity bugs.