The fix landed on November 5, 2026. On November 9, Check Point Research reported active exploitation, including successful root access against an Alpine Linux honeypot. If you run Alpine anywhere with SSH reachable, patch today.
The bug in one paragraph
On systems built with musl libc, crypt() refuses inputs longer than 256 bytes and returns the string *. In /etc/shadow, * is also the marker for an account with no valid password: key-only users, directory users, and root on Alpine since 3.16. If PAM is off, sshd hashes the password you send and compares the result with the stored field. Send a 257–1,024-byte password to a * account and both sides read *. The comparison matches and you are in. No guessing, no retries, one connection.
OpenSSH developer Damien Miller says the root cause sits outside sshd, but sshd is how it gets exploited. OpenSSH 10.6p2 works around it by rejecting stored hashes that are too short to be real hashes.
Am I affected?
Per Alpine and OX Security, all of these must be true:
- sshd runs on musl (Alpine, OpenWrt, Buildroot, Yocto and similar).
- PAM is off. Alpine’s
openssh-serverpackage doesn’t use it, or you setUsePAM no. - PasswordAuthentication is on, which is the default.
- There is an account whose password field is
*: root on Alpine, a key-only user created withadduserwithout a password, thealpineuser on official tiny-cloud images, or a user coming from a directory through musl-nscd. - At least one other local account has a real
$5$or$6$hash.
On Alpine’s official AWS and Azure images, the default alpine user has * and can run doas without a password. Getting into that account effectively gives an attacker root.
Patched versions
| Alpine branch | Fixed openssh |
|---|---|
| edge | 10.6_p2-r0 |
| 3.24 | 10.3_p1-r2 |
| 3.23 | 10.2_p1-r1 |
| 3.22 | 10.0_p1-r11 |
| 3.21 | 9.9_p2-r1 |
| 3.20 | 9.7_p1-r6 |
| 3.19 → 3.16 | 9.6_p1-r3, 9.3_p2-r4, 9.1_p1-r7, 9.0_p1-r6 |
Alpine backported the fix even to branches that are no longer supported. Upstream, take OpenSSH 10.6p2 or later.
What to do now
# Alpine host or image
apk update && apk upgrade openssh openssh-server
rc-service sshd restart # the running daemon keeps the old code until restart
# Can't patch yet? Turn off password logins
echo 'PasswordAuthentication no' >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
rc-service sshd restart
# Find accounts an attacker could target
awk -F: '$2=="*"{print $1}' /etc/shadow
For platform teams:
- Rebuild container images that run sshd on an Alpine base, such as bastions, CI runners, SFTP sidecars and “debug” images. Pinned base tags won’t pick up the fix by themselves.
- Inventory embedded and edge gear on OpenWrt, Buildroot or Yocto. Those builds often ship sshd without PAM and update slowly.
- Check auth logs for successful password logins to accounts that should be key-only, especially root. Treat any you find as a compromise.
Why this one moved fast
Miller said the release went out the day after the report because “we have recently observed multiple cases of rapid bug rediscovery by AI agents, sometimes within hours,” and long embargoes now mostly help attackers. Detectify’s Fredrik Almroth pointed out that each attempt is a single cheap connection against roughly 22 million SSH hosts Shodan can see. Four days later, Check Point reported exploitation.