CVE-2026-123710: Service key server /keys (key rotation token validation)
Key rotation only checked that the presented JWT was signed by an approved service key with the expected audience and issuer, not that it was a rotation credential. An anonymous registry token from /v2/auth, with an audience the caller chooses, passes, letting an unauthenticated attacker install an approved signing key with no expiry. Tokens signed with it are accepted for every repository, giving read/write access to private images and tag replacement; the key persists across restarts and can be used to delete legitimate keys.
Executive Summary & Technical Impact
Key rotation only checked that the presented JWT was signed by an approved service key with the expected audience and issuer, not that it was a rotation credential. An anonymous registry token from /v2/auth, with an audience the caller chooses, passes, letting an unauthenticated attacker install an approved signing key with no expiry. Tokens signed with it are accepted for every repository, giving read/write access to private images and tag replacement; the key persists across restarts and can be used to delete legitimate keys.
Tracked under CVE-2026-123710 (CWE-1287 (Improper Validation of Specified Type of Input)), this vulnerability affects All Red Hat Quay 3 and Quay 5 releases before the fixed builds (standalone, Quay Operator on OpenShift, mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift) and carries a severity score of 9.8 (CRITICAL). Engineering and security operations teams running Red Hat Quay should prioritize upgrading to Quay 3.9.28, 3.10.28, 3.12.24, 3.14.10, 3.15.9, 3.16.7, 3.17.7 (3.18 fix not confirmed for this CVE); Quay.io fixed.
Remediation & Patch Guidance
- Restrict /keys at the proxy or load balancer to trusted internal components.
- Review audit logs for service_key_rotate and service_key_delete events with a null expiration_date and remove unrecognized approved keys (not durable until patched).
- Upgrade to the fixed Quay build for your branch and treat images as potentially tampered if a rogue key is found.
Frequently Asked Questions (CVE-2026-123710)
What versions are affected by CVE-2026-123710?
CVE-2026-123710 affects All Red Hat Quay 3 and Quay 5 releases before the fixed builds (standalone, Quay Operator on OpenShift, mirror registry for Red Hat OpenShift) in Red Hat Quay (Service key server /keys (key rotation token validation)).
How do I patch or remediate CVE-2026-123710?
Upgrade affected deployments to Quay 3.9.28, 3.10.28, 3.12.24, 3.14.10, 3.15.9, 3.16.7, 3.17.7 (3.18 fix not confirmed for this CVE); Quay.io fixed and verify the remediation steps listed above.
What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-123710?
CVE-2026-123710 is rated CRITICAL with a CVSS score of 9.8 (vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H; anonymous /v2/auth token with caller-chosen audience presented to the key rotation endpoint).
Red Hat Quay CVE-2026-123710 and CVE-2026-110697: Anonymous Signing-Key Takeover and Cross-Tenant Robot Token Theft
One anonymous request can plant a never-expiring signing key in Quay's key server, which gives read and write access to every private image. A second bug uses a SQL LIKE underscore to leak other tenants' robot tokens. Fixed builds are out for Quay 3.9 through 3.17.
Read full engineering post-mortem (5 min read) →